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There is an old saying that “hindsight is 20/20.” The 
hindsight effect describes the observation that once peo-
ple are aware of the outcome to a situation, they have a
tendency to falsely believe that they would have predicted 
that outcome. This retrospective judgment bias is robust 
across a wide variety of domains and task environments 
(see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, 
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 
1990, for reviews). Although researchers have systemati-
cally studied this effect for over 30 years, there is still not a 
unified theory of the effect that can explain results across 
different judgment types and task domains.
Researchers have proposed two classes of cognitive re-
construction models to explain how retrospective judgment 
formation leads to the hindsight effect (Hawkins & Hastie, 
1990). Anchor and adjust theories propose that people 
produce their retrospective judgments by starting with the 
given outcome and adjusting their judgment away from that 
anchor, based on metacognitive cues. One proposed adjust-
ment mechanism is that people might attempt to recall how 
“surprising” they found the given outcome to be and adjust 
their judgment on the basis of this metacognitive informa-
tion (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990, 
1997). According to this theory, if a person recalls that the 
p , goutcome was ex ected  he or she would et an “I would 
have known that!” feeling. Based on this metacognitive in-
formation, a person will make a small adjustment from the
given outcome, thereby overestimating his or her predictive 
accuracy. It is this underadjustment that leads to hindsight 
bias. On the other hand, if a person recalls that the out-
come was surprising, he or she would get an “I would have
 never known that!” feeling. This metacognitive information
would lead the person to make a larger retrospective adjust-
ment, thereby reducing the likelihood of hindsight bias.
The second class of explanations for the hindsight ef-
fect can be considered updating and rejudging theories 
(Carli, 1999; Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins &
Hastie, 1990; Pezzo, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1996; Wasser-
man, Lempert, & Hastie, 1991; Wiley & Trabasso, 2003).
According to this perspective, exposure to outcome in-
formation affects the mental representation of the event 
or situation. Outcome knowledge can affect the memory 
representation by rendering outcome-supporting informa-
tion more available in long-term memory or by reducing 
the weight given to the evidence supporting other possible 
outcomes (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). According to this 
theory, hindsight bias occurs because people use this up-
dated representation to reconstruct their predictive opin-
dions. Because the representation of the event has change  
pp , pto be more su ortive of the actual event outcome  a er-
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paradigm, researchers have found hindsight bias effects
on two different types of measures: outcome-likelihood 
predictions and evidence-importance judgments (see, e.g.,
Carli, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Wasserman et al., 1991). 
Outcome-likelihood predictions are produced when people
are asked to judge the probability of different possible out-
comes of the event or situation. Hindsight bias on this type
of measure is observed as higher retrospective likelihood 
ratings for the given outcome. Evidence-importance judg-
ments are produced when people are asked to rate the im-
portance or relevance of each sentence or piece of evidence 
presented in the narrative or case history, in terms of de-
termining the outcome. Hindsight bias on this type of mea-
sure is observed as higher retrospective importance ratings 
for outcome-supporting information. In this paradigm, the 
predictive and retrospective judgments that relate to the 
task are comprehension or representation based. This is be-
cause people must use their understanding of the evidence
and how it relates to an outcome in order to produce their 
judgments. We propose that in these tasks, changes to the
mental representation may lead to changes in retrospective 
judgments. Therefore, the judgment reconstruction pro-
cesses described by updating and rejudging theories seem
to provide a plausible explanation for hindsight bias for 
these types of situational judgment tasks.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we collected metacognitive judg-
ments, such as those used in trivia tasks, and situational 
judgments, such as those used in case study tasks, using
the same stimulus materials. The goal was to see whether 
patterns of hindsight bias depended on the nature of the 
judgment tasks. Multicomponent mathematical and in-
sight problems where chosen as the stimulus materials 
because complex problem solving has both performance 
and representational aspects that can be assessed. The per-
formance aspect involved in problem solving tasks makes
these stimuli similar to those used in trivia task paradigms
and allows for the assessment of predictive and retrospec-
tive metacognitive judgments. However, unlike most sim-
ple trivia or general knowledge tasks, complex problem 
solving also has a representational aspect that makes it
comparable to case study paradigms. Most problem solv-
ing theories and computational models of problem solv-
ing include the formation of a mental representation of 
the problem as an initial phase (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere, 
1998; Newell & Simon, 1972). Kintsch (1998) proposed 
that the formation of a mental problem representation re-
lies on the same cognitive processes as the comprehension
of events, situations, or texts. Therefore, complex prob-
lem solving tasks also lend themselves to situational judg-
ments, such as those used in case study paradigms.
Insight and mathematical problems were chosen in order 
to differentiate between effects due to metacognitive reac-
tions and those due to representational updating (see the 
Appendix for a list of problems). Insight problems have
long been used to study how people overcome representa-
tional difficulty and find creative solutions (e.g., Duncker, 
1945; Maier, 1931). The types of problems used in insight 
son will overestimate his or her predictive accuracy. Thus, 
it is the representation change caused by acquiring out-
come knowledge that leads to hindsight bias.
In the present studies, we investigate whether these dif-
ferent explanations of the hindsight bias should be viewed 
as competing accounts of the same effect, or whether these
theories may represent explanations of different judgment 
phenomena that have been grouped under the umbrella
term hindsight bias. There are two main paradigms that
have been used to investigate hindsight effects: trivia tasks
and case study tasks (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 
1991; Guilbault et al., 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). 
These paradigms also differ in the kinds of judgment tasks 
they use for the bases of the hindsight measure. Below, we 
argue that anchor and adjust theories of the hindsight bias 
may provide a more appropriate explanation for hindsight 
effects that are traditionally found in trivia task paradigms, 
whereas updating and rejudging theories may provide a 
more appropriate explanation for the effects traditionally 
found in case study paradigms. We support this distinction 
in two experiments that use a problem solving paradigm 
to investigate the role of different types of judgment tasks 
on hindsight bias effects.
Trivia Task Versus Case Study Paradigms
Trivia task paradigms present a general knowledge 
question as the target event or situation to be judged, such 
as, “What percentage of Germans live in cities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants?” (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003, 
p. 399). People are generally asked to judge the likelihood 
of getting the answer correct. The feedback in these ex-
periments consists of either being told the correct answer 
to the question or being given feedback about the accu-
racy of one’s own response. In this paradigm, research-
ers have found hindsight bias effects on several different 
types of measures, including predictions of their own (or 
their peers’) likelihood of producing the correct response 
to a question (e.g., Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989); numeric 
answers to problems or trivia questions (e.g., Schwarz & 
Stahlberg, 2003); and confidence ratings for answers to 
forced-choice trivia questions (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein, 
& Fischhoff, 1980). On these types of judgment tasks, the 
predictive and retrospective judgments are metacogni-
tive in nature because people must use their beliefs about 
their own knowledge or abilities in the domain to formu-
late their judgments. Therefore, it seems reasonable that
people may use their metacognitive reactions to outcome 
feedback (i.e., the “I would have known that!” feeling) as 
cues in reconstructing their previous metacognitive judg-
ments. We propose that the judgment reconstruction pro-
cesses described by anchor and adjust theories provide a 
plausible explanation for hindsight bias effects on these 
types of metacognitive judgment tasks.
Case study paradigms present a narrative story or de-
scription of a situation, such as a medical case history 
(Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988) or a story describ-
ing an upcoming event (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975). Participants 
are generally asked to predict the outcome of the event. 
The feedback in these experiments consists of a conclusion 
to the story or description of the “true” outcome. In this 
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the problem that needed to be used or manipulated to correctly solve the 
problem. For example in the “Camp Alaska” math problem (Appendix, 
Problem 4), the three people going on the camping trip were an adult 
male, an adult female, and a male teen. Therefore, the components in
the chart that corresponded to these values were the relevant compo-
nents. All other components in the chart were unnecessary in order to
solve the problem. Therefore, these parts of the problem were irrelevant 
components. An insight problem example is the “Six Glasses” prob-
lem (Appendix, Problem 6). In order to solve the problem, one had to
pour the liquid from the second glass into the fifth glass. The fifth glass 
was therefore the relevant component. The first, third, fourth, and sixth
glasses were the irrelevant components. The second glass was excluded 
because it was implied to be important in the solution in the directions,
and therefore any possible solution (even if incorrect) had to involve it. 
This component was therefore considered to be nondiagnostic in as-
sessing the appropriateness of an individual’s problem representation.
The Appendix lists all insight and math problems used in this study. The 
relevant components for each problem are underlined.
The initial rating packet comprised eight different paper-and-
pencil rating packets that presented the problems in a counterbal-
anced order, with the constraints that every other problem was
either an insight or math problem and that each problem was the
first and last problem in one of the orders. The cover page of the
packet instructed participants to carefully read each problem without 
attempting to solve the problem. Instead, they were told that they
would be asked a series of opinion questions about each problem. 
The directions stressed that we did not want them to begin solving
the problems and that we were interested in their initial impressions 
of the problems. The directions also explained the rating procedure
continuum for the questions described below.
The first page for each problem presented the entire problem below
the sentence, “Please read this problem. Do NOT attempt to solve.” 
Underneath the problem were general opinion questions about the
problem, including the question, “How likely is it that you will com-
plete this problem correctly in 3 minutes?” Below this question was a 
7.3-cm continuum anchored with not very likely on the left and very
likely on the right. This rating served as the predictive metacognitive
judgment. On the following pages, each component of the problem
was listed with the directions to “Please rate each component on how 
important it will be in solving the problem.” Below each problem
component was a 7.3-cm continuum with not important on the left and 
very important on the right. These ratings were combined (as detailed 
below) to serve as the predictive situational judgment.
The problem solving packet presented the same eight problems, 
each on its own page, in the same order as in the rating booklet.
The directions were presented on the cover page of the booklet. The 
directions informed participants that they would be given 3 min to 
complete each problem. The directions asked participants to show all 
work, circle their final answer, and explain their solution in writing,
if necessary. The directions explicitly stated that all problems had 
solutions and that answers such as impossible or not solvable would 
be counted as incorrect. Finally, the directions instructed participants
to wait for the experimenter’s signal before beginning each problem.
Following their solution attempts, we showed all participants the
correct solution to each problem. For each problem, we created a
script providing a step-by-step explanation of the correct solution
procedure. Also, for each problem, we created a corresponding over-
head projector slide that procedurally and/or graphically displayed 
the correct solution process. For example, the “Camp Alaska” slide 
had each of the three components used in solving the problem under-
lined and then showed each necessary mathematical calculation. The
“Six Glasses” problem slide showed a graphical representation of 
the initial problem situation, a picture of the contents of the second 
glass being poured into the fifth glass, and a final solution represen-
tation, with the empty glass returned to its original position.
The rating memory packet was identical to the initial rating packet, 
except the directions asked participants to “Attempt to remember your 
original ratings from last week’s session. In other words, do NOT rate
these problems again. Try to remember the point in the scale that rep-
research are designed to be unfamiliar and misleading, and 
typically lead people to form initial mental problem rep-
resentations that are inappropriate for finding the correct 
solution path (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Knoblich, Ohlsson, 
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Met-
calfe & Wiebe, 1987; Ohlsson, 1992; Wiley, 1998). Many 
researchers have proposed that people overcome the rep-
resentational difficulties posed by these problems through 
cognitive processes that change or restructure the initial 
faulty problem representation (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Durso, 
Rea, & Dayton, 1994; Jones, 2003; Kaplan & Simon, 
1990; Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Multistep 
mathematical problems were chosen as a contrast class 
of problems for which most college students should have 
ample prior experience. On these problems, participants 
should have well-practiced strategies and analogous prob-
lems available in long-term memory that should help them 
avoid forming inappropriate representations (e.g., Ross & 
Kilbane, 1997). Therefore, the solution of mathematical 
problems should be highly unlikely to involve representa-
tional change or restructuring processes.1
These problems were used as the stimuli in a within-
participants hindsight bias paradigm, such as those com-
monly used in trivia-based hindsight investigations (e.g., 
Pohl & Hell, 1996; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003). Participants
were initially asked to make metacognitive judgments (like-
lihood of solving) and situational judgments (importance 
of each problem component) for each problem. Then they
were given 3 min to attempt to solve each problem. Outcome 
feedback was given in the form of step-by-step explanations 
of each problem solution. A week later, participants returned 
and attempted to remember their initial ratings. Hindsight 
bias was assessed as the changes between initial ratings 
(predictions) and memory rating (retrospections).
Solutions to both types of problems used in this study 
involved a series of simple steps to complete. Therefore, 
we propose that exposure to the solutions to either type 
of problem should have been equally likely to elicit an
“I would have known that!” reaction. Anchor and adjust
theories would therefore propose that both problem types 
should be susceptible to hindsight bias effects. However, 
insight problems are more likely to involve representa-
tional change or restructuring than are mathematical prob-
lems. Therefore, updating and rejudging theories would 
predict that insight problems should be most susceptible 
to the hindsight bias. Specifically, this theory would pre-
dict that hindsight bias effects should be most prevalent 
on successfully solved insight problems, due to the spon-
taneous restructuring that occurs as part of the insightful 
problem solving process (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000).
Method
Participants. Fifty-one introductory psychology students from 
the University of Illinois at Chicago Subject Pool completed both 
sessions of this experiment for partial fulfillment of a class research
participation requirement.
Materials. The problem stimuli comprised four insight problems 
and four multistep math problems that were chosen or designed for this 
study (see the Appendix for problems and note 1 for the manipulation 
check). The elements of each problem were categorized as being rel-
evant or irrelevant for solution. Relevant components were those parts of 
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constant. Therefore, we needed to make within-participants 
comparisons of insight and math problems for both suc-
cessful and unsuccessful solution attempts. Therefore, we 
selected participants who both correctly and incorrectly 
solved at least one of the insight and math problems. Oth-
erwise, different groups of people would have contributed 
data in each condition, and any effects could be due to char-
acteristics of the groups (i.e., good vs. poor problem solv-
ers) rather than to the variables of interest. This participant 
selection procedure was based on Metcalfe’s (Metcalfe, 
1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) work investigating
metacognition and problem solving. Of the 51 participants
who completed the study, 25 participants had data in each 
cell and were included in the analyses below.
For the within-participants sample, a dependent samples 
t test comparing the mean proportion of successfully solved 
math and insight problems revealed no difference in solu-
tion success rates [math, M? .49, SE? .034; insight, M?
.45, SE ? .038; t(24) ? 0.70, p ? .49, d ? 0.14]. Table 1
displays the number of successful, incorrect, and unsolved 
observations for each problem. As the table shows, there was
considerable variability in success rates within the math and 
insight problems. Because of this variability among prob-
lems, we aggregated the rating data both by participants
and by problems in order to examine hindsight effect as a
function of problem type and solution success.
The by-participants analysis resulted in a 2 ( judgment: 
predictive vs. retrospective) ? 2 (problem type: insight vs.
math) ? 2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
repeated measures design with 25 observations per cell.2
This analysis controlled for individual differences among
problem solvers, but allowed individual problems to con-
tribute more or less to each solution success category, de-
pending on their solution rates. A planned comparison ap-
proach was adopted on the by-participants analysis in order 
to maximize power.3 To investigate the effects of problem 
type and solution success on hindsight bias, we conducted 
retrospective–predictive contrasts at alpha level ? .05 for 
each of the problem type ? success conditions.
The by-problems analysis resulted in a 2 ( judgment: 
predictive vs. retrospective) ? 2 (problem type: insight vs. 
resents your original opinion of these problems.” Furthermore, on 
each page of the booklet, “Please reproduce your original ratings from
last week’s session” appeared over each set of questions. Participants
were asked to remember their rating for “How likely is it that you will
complete this problem correctly in 3 minutes?” The rating from this
question served as the retrospective metacognitive judgment. Like-
wise, the ratings from the component importance questions were com-
bined to serve as the retrospective situational judgment.
Procedure. In Session 1, participants completed the study in 
groups of 3 to 12 and were randomly assigned to one of the eight prob-
lem orders. Participants sat so that those with the same-ordered packet 
were not placed next to each other. The session began with participants 
completing the informed consent form. Next, participants completed 
the initial rating packet. Upon completing the rating packet, partici-
pants attempted to solve each problem in the problem solving packet.
Participants were given a maximum of 3 min to solve each problem. 
The experimenter kept time with a stopwatch and alerted the group 
when there were 30 sec left for solving. Before moving on to the next 
problem, the participants were reminded to circle their final answer, if 
they had reached one. After the problem solving phase was complete,
the experimenter showed step-by-step solutions for each problem in 
a random order. The experimenter read a script that walked through
each solution, and presented an overhead slide outlining the proce-
dure. Each solution explanation took approximately 1 min. Finally,
the experimenter asked participants not to discuss the experiment with
anyone, including other members of the group.
In Session 2, participants returned to the same room exactly 1 week 
later and were seated in the same positions. The experimenter gave
each participant a rating memory packet that matched the order of 
their Session 1 packets, as well as another problem solving packet.
The experimenter read the directions for the rating memory packet
while the participants followed along. The experimenter asked the
participants to pay close attention to the directions because they dif-
fered from the previous week’s directions. After completing the mem-
ory task, participants attempted to solve each problem again and were
debriefed, reminded not to discuss the experiment, and dismissed.
Data coding. We coded the likelihood ratings by measuring the 
distance of the participant’s mark on the 7.3-cm continuum with a 
ruler, so that lower scores indicated lower likelihood of solving and 
higher scores indicated higher likelihood of solving. We coded the 
component importance ratings in the same way. On these ratings,
lower scores indicate lower importance ratings and higher scores in-
dicate higher importance ratings. Since all problems have different
ratios of relevant and irrelevant components, we averaged the ratings
across relevant and irrelevant components within each problem. Next,
the scores on the irrelevant components were reverse-coded, so that 
higher values on both types of components represented more appro-
priate problem representations. Finally, we combined average relevant 
and average reverse-coded irrelevant measures into a single compo-
nent importance score by taking the unweighted average of the two
indexes. The higher the component importance score, the closer the
individual was to the correct problem representation for solution.
For the problem solving phase, we had instructed participants to 
circle their final answer on each problem. Therefore, we coded any
problem with a correct, circled final answer as a successfully solved 
problem. We coded all other problems as unsuccessfully solved 
problems. Within the unsuccessfully solved problems, we tallied 
two different types of failures: incorrect and unsolved. We coded 
problems as incorrectly solved if participants had circled a final an-
swer that did not match the correct solution. We coded all problems
without a circled final answer as unsolved problems.
Results
Quasi-experimental design and analysis strategy. 
Our research question was not whether certain classes of 
people (i.e., more intelligent, less intelligent) would be 
more likely to show hindsight bias, but rather discerning 
when hindsight would be observed, keeping all other things 
Table 1
Experiment 1 Solution Rates (Frequency and Percentage)
Unsuccessful
Successful Incorrect Unsolved
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Math Problems
Solve for Y 9 36 9 36 7 28
Cash 10 40 15 60 0 0
Distance 14 56 6 24 5 20
Food 16 64 6 24 3 12
Total 49 49 36 36 15 15
Insight Problems
Triangle 18 72 1 4 6 24
Glasses 15 60 8 32 2 8
Match III 5 20 13 52 7 28
Match XV 7 28 7 28 11 44
Total 45 45 29 29 26 26
Note—N? 25.
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The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 2 for both the 
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
From the by-participants analysis, significant hindsight 
bias on likelihood ratings was detected on successfully 
solved math problems, successfully solved insight prob-
lems, and unsuccessfully solved insight problems. The ef-
fect for unsuccessfully solved math problems was in the 
same direction as that for the other conditions. However, 
this effect was approximately half the size of the effect in 
the other conditions and was not statistically significant. The 
by-problems analysis followed the exact same pattern as the
by-participants analysis. This suggests that the effects ob-
served in the by-participants analysis were consistent across 
problems and were not driven by any individual problem.
Hindsight bias for situational judgments. Panel A 
of Figure 2 displays the mean predictive and retrospective 
component importance scores as a function of problem 
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis. 
Panel B of Figure 2 displays the same data when scores 
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
math) ? 2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
mixed design, with problem type as a between-problems
variable. Once again, we conducted a retrospective–
predictive contrast for each of the problem type ? success
conditions. Since this analysis has only four observations
per cell, this design provided very low power for detecting
hindsight effects. However, the main point of this analy-
sis was to examine whether the effects observed in the
by-participants analysis were due to specific problems or 
were consistent across problems. Therefore, these effects
will be examined descriptively, in order to assess whether 
they follow the same qualitative pattern as that for the by-
participants analyses.
Hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments. 
Panel A of Figure 1 displays the mean predictive and 
retrospective likelihood ratings as a function of problem 
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis. 
Panel B of Figure 1 displays the same data when ratings 
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the 
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using 


























































Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Math Insight
Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Figure 1. Experiment 1 mean predictive and retrospective metacognitive
judgments (solution likelihood ratings) as a function of problem type and solu-
tion. Error bars? standard error; d? Cohen’s d.
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Table 2
Experiment 1 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Metacognitive Judgments (Likelihood Ratings), 
As a Function of Problem Type and Solution Success
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast Upper Bound Lower Bound F p
By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful 0.82 1.34 0.29 10.40 .004
Unsuccessful 0.36 0.88 ?0.16 2.03 .167
Insight
Successful 0.70 1.22 0.18 7.62 .011
Unsuccessful 0.66 1.18 0.13 6.71 .016
By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful 0.90 1.54 0.27 12.07 .013
Unsuccessful 0.37 1.01 ?0.27 2.03 .204
Insight
Successful 0.80 1.43 0.16 9.44 .021
Unsuccessful 0.60 1.24 ?0.04 5.34 .060
Note—MSe for the rating? problem ? success interaction was used for the calcula-
tion of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSe? .802; by-problems
MSe? .135). For the by-participants analysis, df? 1,24; for the by-problems analy-
sis, df? 1,6.



























































Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
Math Insight
Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
d ? ?0.02d ? 0.79d ? 0.11d ? 0.32
d ? 0.60 d ? 0.34 d ? 1.98 d ? 0.52
Figure 2. Experiment 1 mean predictive and retrospective situational judg-
ments (component importance scores) as a function of problem type and solu-
tion success. Error bars? standard error; d? Cohen’s d.
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both problem type and solution success. On the metacog-
nitive judgments, significant hindsight bias was detected 
in all conditions, except for unsuccessfully solved math
problems. In the introduction to this experiment, we pro-
posed that exposure to correct solutions should lead to an
“I would have known that!” reaction, regardless of prob-
lem type. However, the observed pattern suggests that
exposure to the solutions to unsuccessfully solved math
problems did not evoke the same metacognitive reaction 
as it did in the other conditions.
Problem type and success also affected hindsight bias
in the situational ratings. Although a substantial hindsight
effect was detected on correctly solved insight problems, 
we found no evidence of hindsight bias on unsuccessfully 
solved insight problems. This moderating effect of solution 
success was not completely unexpected; it is consistent 
with evidence from prior insight studies that have shown
that restructuring may only occur when a person actually 
solves an insight problem, and not simply as the result of 
being told the solution (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000).
Theories of the hindsight effect that describe it as an 
outcome knowledge effect would suggest that any knowl-
edge of an outcome should be enough to produce the ef-
fect. However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that 
there may be different sources of feedback that may lead 
to different kinds of hindsight effects: internal feedback 
that comes from self-generated solution attempts and out-
come knowledge from external feedback, such as being 
told the correct solutions. In Experiment 2, we seek to bet-
ter understand the role that internally generated outcome 
knowledge may play in producing hindsight effects.
EXPERIMENT 2
The effects of solution success on the hindsight bias 
we found in Experiment 1 suggest that the externally pro-
vided outcome feedback was not the only factor leading to
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using 
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations. 
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective 
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 3 for both the 
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
From the by-participants analysis, significant hindsight 
bias on component importance judgments was detected 
only on successfully solved insight problems. The effects 
for all other problem type and solution conditions were 
substantially smaller and failed to approach statistical sig-
nificance. The by-problems analysis followed the exact
same pattern as did the by-participants analysis. This sug-
gests that the effect observed on successfully solved in-
sight problems was consistent across problems and was 
not driven by any individual problem.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, the hindsight patterns observed on 
the two types of judgments qualitatively differed. On the 
metacognitive judgments (solution likelihood ratings),
hindsight bias was observed on both math and insight 
problems. However, on situational judgments (component 
importance scores), hindsight bias was only observed on 
successfully solved insight problems. This pattern sup-
ports the notion that hindsight bias for these different types 
of judgments represents different psychological phenom-
ena and requires different theoretical explanations. The 
pattern of results for metacognitive judgments in this ex-
periment seems most consistent with the basic premises 
of the anchor and adjust theories that suggest that people 
use metacognitive responses to outcome information in 
order to reconstruct their judgments. On the other hand, 
the pattern of hindsight bias on the component importance 
ratings is more consistent with the updating and rejudging 
explanation of hindsight bias.
One interesting aspect of the results of this experiment 
was that the hindsight effects differed as a function of 
Table 3
Experiment 1 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Situational Judgments (Component Importance Scores),
As a Function of Problem Type and Solution Success
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast Upper Bound Lower Bound F p
By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful 0.29 0.72 ?0.15 1.83 .189
Unsuccessful 0.10 0.53 ?0.34 0.20 .659
Insight
Successful 0.70 1.14 0.26 10.85 .003
Unsuccessful ?0.02 0.42 ?0.46 0.01 .921
By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful 0.24 1.02 ?0.53 0.59 .472
Unsuccessful 0.15 0.92 ?0.62 0.22 .656
Insight
Successful 0.81 1.58 0.03 6.52 .043
Unsuccessful 0.21 0.98 ?0.56 0.44 .532
Note—MSe for the rating? problem ? success interaction was used for the calcula-
tion of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSe? .562; by-problems
MSe? .200). For the by-participants analysis, df? 1,24; for the by-problems analy-
sis, df? 1,6.
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vs. math)? 2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccess-
ful) repeated measures design with 30 observations per 
cell. The by-problems analysis resulted in a 2 ( judgment: 
predictive vs. retrospective)? 2 (problem type: insight vs. 
math) ? 2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
mixed design with problem type as a between-problems 
variable and four observations per cell. In order to inves-
tigate the effects of problem type and solution success on
hindsight bias, we conducted a retrospective–predictive 
judgment contrast at alpha level ? .05 for each of the 
problem type ? solution success conditions.
Hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments.
Panel A of Figure 3 displays the mean predictive and 
retrospective likelihood ratings as a function of problem 
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 3 displays the same data when ratings
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the 
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using 
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations. 
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 5 for both the 
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
The by-participants analysis revealed a large hindsight
bias on successfully solved math problems and a moderate
hindsight bias on successfully solved insight problems. In
both of these conditions, participants’ mean retrospective 
likelihood ratings were higher than their presolution-attempt
predictive ratings. This pattern replicates the Experiment 1
finding of hindsight bias effects for successfully solved 
math and insight problems. As in Experiment 1, there was
no significant hindsight bias effect detected on unsuc-
cessfully solved math problems. However, unsuccessfully
solved insight problems followed a different pattern from 
that seen in Experiment 1. In this experiment, participants 
showed a reverse hindsight bias, producing significantly
lower retrospective likelihood ratings after unsuccessful
solution attempts on insight problems. The by-problems 
analysis revealed the same overall pattern of results as did 
the by-participants analysis, although in this analysis, only
the large hindsight effect observed on successfully solved 
math problems reached statistical significance.
changes in retrospective judgments. We propose that the 
act of actively attempting to solve a problem may provide 
internally generated feedback that may have independent 
effects on retrospective judgment formation. However,
we were unable to find any studies that have specifically 
looked for hindsight bias effects on successfully and un-
successfully solved problems in the absence of externally 
provided feedback. Therefore, in this study, we replicated 
the procedure of Experiment 1. However, after the partici-
pants attempted to solve the problems, we did not provide 
them with any solution feedback. There were two goals of 
this experiment. The first goal was to investigate the role 
of internally generated feedback in hindsight effects on 
metacognitive and situational judgments. The second goal 
was to see whether the effects caused by internally gen-
erated feedback would replicate the disassociations be-
tween metacognitive and situational judgments that were 
observed in Experiment 1. We predicted that hindsight 
bias on metacognitive judgments should follow a pattern 
consistent with anchor and adjust explanations of hind-
sight bias, and hindsight bias on situational judgments 
should follow a pattern consistent with updating and re-
judging theories of hindsight bias. Therefore, we again 
predicted similar hindsight bias patterns on metacognitive 
judgments for both math and insight problems. However, 
we predicted hindsight bias on situational judgments only 
for successfully solved insight problems.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight introductory psychology students from 
the University of Illinois at Chicago Subject Pool completed both
sessions of this experiment for partial fulfillment of a class research
participation requirement.
Materials and Procedure. All of the materials and the proce-
dure used in this experiment were identical to those in Experiment 1.
The only difference occurred at the end of Session 1. In this experi-
ment, participants were dismissed from Session 1 directly after the
problem solving phase of the experiment. Therefore, no one in this
study was shown the step-by-step solutions, and no one received any 
external feedback about the accuracy of their solutions.
Results
Quasi-experimental design and analysis strategy. 
Once again, we created a fully within-participants design
by selecting only participants who correctly and incorrectly 
solved at least one of each of the problem types. Out of 
the 48 participants who completed the study, 30 had solu-
tion patterns that conformed to these criteria. A dependent 
samples t test comparing the mean proportion of success-
fully solved math and insight problems revealed no overall 
difference in solution success rates [math, M ? .45, SE ?
.035; insight, M ? .43, SE ? .032; t(29) ? 0.65, p ? .52, 
d ? 0.12]. Table 4 displays the number of successful, in-
correct, and unsolved observations for each problem. Once 
again, there was considerable variability in success rates 
within the math and insight problems. Therefore, we aggre-
gated the rating data both by participants and by problems 
in order to be able to assess whether hindsight bias patterns 
were consistent across participants and problems.
The by-participants analysis resulted in a 2 ( judgment: 
predictive vs. retrospective) ? 2 (problem type: insight 
Table 4
Experiment 2 Solution Rates (Frequency and Percentage)
Unsuccessful
Successful Incorrect Unsolved
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Math Problems
Solve for Y 8 27 10 33 12 40
Cash 11 37 16 53 3 10
Distance 22 73 5 17 3 10
Food 13 43 16 53 1 3
Total 54 45 47 39 19 16
Insight Problems
Triangle 12 40 10 33 8 27
Glasses 22 73 5 17 3 10
Match III 7 23 10 33 13 43
Match XV 10 33 6 20 14 47
Total 51 43 31 26 38 32
Note—N? 30.
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d ? ?0.39d ? 0.34d ? 0.12d ? 0.70
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 mean predictive and retrospective metacognitive
judgments (solution likelihood ratings) as a function of problem type and solu-
tion success. Error bars? standard error; d? Cohen’s d.
Table 5
Experiment 2 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive
and Retrospective Metacognitive Judgments (Likelihood Ratings), 
As a Function of Problem Type and Solution Success
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast Upper Bound Lower Bound F p
By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful 1.07 1.53 0.60 21.85 .000
Unsuccessful 0.19 0.66 ?0.28 0.70 .410
Insight
Successful 0.56 1.03 0.09 6.00 .021
Unsuccessful ?0.60 ?0.13 ?1.07 6.92 .014
By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful 0.87 1.71 0.03 6.35 .045
Unsuccessful 0.12 0.97 ?0.72 0.13 .731
Insight
Successful 0.61 1.46 ?0.23 3.19 .124
Unsuccessful ?0.68 0.16 ?1.53 3.94 .094
Note—MSe for the rating? problem ? success interaction was used for the calcula-
tion of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSe? .782; by-problems
MSe? .237). For the by-participants analysis, df? 1,29; for the by-problems analy-
sis, df? 1,6.
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tion, participants’ retrospective component importance
scores were significantly lower than their initial scores. 
Therefore, participants’ retrospective judgments suggested 
a less appropriate problem representation on unsuccessfully 
solved insight problems. The by-problems analysis revealed 
the same pattern as the by-participants analysis. There was
one notable difference, though. In the by-problems analy-
sis, the magnitude of the hindsight effect for successfully 
solved insight problems appeared larger than the effect for 
unsuccessfully solved problems. However, when we aggre-
gated the data across problems, the magnitude of the effects 
was similar. This suggests that the overall pattern is consis-
tent across problems. However, there may have been some 
differences in the magnitude of hindsight effects among 
insight problems, which led to the differences in effect size 
that were observed in the by-participants analysis.
Discussion
The results of this experiment showed that hindsight ef-
fects are not confined to situations in which individuals 
receive external outcome feedback. In this experiment, 
Hindsight bias for situational judgments. Panel A
of Figure 4 displays the mean predictive and retrospective
component importance scores as a function of problem
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 4 displays the same data when scores
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations.
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 6 for both the
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
As in Experiment 1, the by-participants analysis detected 
no evidence of hindsight bias on component importance
scores for successfully or unsuccessfully solved math prob-
lems. Likewise, a significant hindsight effect was detected 
on successfully solved insight problems. After successfully
solving insight problems, participants’ retrospective com-
ponent importance scores were indicative of a more appro-
priate problem representation than that indicated by their 
initial predictive scores. The opposite pattern was observed 
on unsuccessfully solved insight problems. In this condi-
d ? 0.07 d ? ?0.53d ? 0.80d ? 0.21
d ? 0.23 d ? 0.40 d ? 1.19 d ? ?1.39
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Figure 4. Experiment 2 mean predictive and retrospective situational judg-
ments (component importance scores) as a function of problem type and solu-
tion success. Error bars? standard error; d? Cohen’s d.
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tise in a domain may lead to greater hindsight bias effects
on these types of metacognitive judgments.
It appears that the saliency of internally generated feed-
back may be reversed for unsuccessfully solved problems.
For math problems, failure cues may not be as salient as 
for insight problems. Failing to solve math problems may 
happen for mundane reasons, such as miscalculations, that 
may not even be noticed by the solver. Thus, salient cues
may not exist when one fails to solve a math problem. This 
would explain why no hindsight bias effects were detected 
on unsuccessfully solved math problems in either experi-
ment. However, for unsuccessfully solved insight prob-
lems, the internal cues associated with failure may be very 
apparent. In fact, this internal recognition of “being stuck” 
or reaching an impasse plays a central role in some theories
of the insightful problem solving process (e.g., Knoblich,
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). This recognition of being at an
impasse could lead to an “I never would have known that!” 
feeling, which would explain the direction of the hindsight
effect we observed on unsuccessfully solved insight prob-
lems. As in Experiment 1, the hindsight bias patterns on 
these metacognitive judgments are best explained by the
anchor and adjust theory of hindsight effects.
The situational judgment results followed a qualita-
tively different pattern. On these measures, individuals 
exhibited hindsight effects only on insight problems. On
successfully solved insight problems, retrospective rat-
ings were biased toward a more appropriate problem rep-
resentation than were predictive ratings. On unsuccess-
fully solved insight problems, retrospective ratings were
biased toward a less appropriate problem representation. 
The pattern is more consistent with the update and rejudge
explanation of retrospective judgment formation. Repre-
sentational change, or restructuring, has been proposed 
as playing a central role in the insightful solution process 
(Ash & Wiley, 2006; Jones, 2003; Kaplan & Simon, 1990;
Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Therefore, it is par-
participants were not shown the correct solution to the 
problems. However, the internally generated feedback that 
resulted from successfully solving math or insight problems 
resulted in hindsight bias on metacognitive judgments. In 
these conditions, the participants’ retrospective ratings over-
estimated their predictive likelihood ratings. Effect sizes 
suggested that this hindsight bias was larger on successfully
solved math problems than for successfully solved insight 
problems. On unsuccessfully solved insight problems, ret-
rospective ratings underestimated original likelihood pre-
dictions, resulting in a reverse hindsight bias. Therefore,
in these three conditions, hindsight bias on metacognitive 
judgments was in the direction of the internally generated 
feedback produced by the successful or unsuccessful solv-
ing attempts. Once again, we propose that these results are 
consistent with anchor and adjust theories of retrospective 
judgment formation. The results on successfully solved 
problems suggest that the internally generated feedback 
that comes with accepting a successful final solution can
produce the “I would have known that!” feeling which, ac-
cording to this theory, leads to the hindsight bias (Hoch & 
Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990, 1997).
The larger hindsight bias effect on math versus insight 
problems suggested by the effect sizes (see Figure 2) was 
also informative. In this experiment, we selected math 
problems as stimulus materials to represent a familiar 
problem solving domain. It may be that the familiar nature 
and procedural solution process for these problems allowed 
for more salient, or certain, internally generated feedback. 
However, the insight problems were selected to represent
unfamiliar and misleading problem situations for which 
individuals do not possess algorithmic strategies for verify-
ing the veracity of their solutions. Therefore, the internally 
generated feedback in these situations may be less salient 
or lead to less certainty that the correct solution had been 
obtained. These observations are consistent with Schwarz 
and Stahlberg’s (2003) suggestion that familiarity or exper-
Table 6
Experiment 2 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Situational Judgments (Component Importance Scores),
As a Function of Problem Type and Solution Success
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast Upper Bound Lower Bound F p
By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful 0.06 0.39 ?0.26 0.15 .701
Unsuccessful 0.19 0.52 ?0.14 1.42 .243
Insight
Successful 0.71 1.03 0.38 19.66 .000
Unsuccessful ?0.47 ?0.15 ?0.80 8.82 .006
By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful 0.09 0.58 ?0.40 0.21 .663
Unsuccessful 0.16 0.65 ?0.33 0.67 .444
Insight
Successful 0.48 0.97 ?0.01 5.84 .052
Unsuccessful ?0.57 ?0.08 ?1.06 8.02 .030
Note—MSe for the rating ? problem ? success interaction was used for the calcula-
tion of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSe ? .381; by-problems
MSe? .080). For the by-participants analysis, df? 1,29; for the by-problems analy-
sis, df? 1,6.
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knowledge effects. We propose that hindsight effects are
best conceptualized as being a by-product of judgment re-
construction processes and are not necessarily an outcome-
knowledge driven phenomenon (see Schwarz & Stahlberg, 
2003, for a similar discussion of this issue). Furthermore,
the differences between hindsight effects on incorrectly 
solved insight problems in the two experiments suggest
that a failure to detect hindsight effects does not necessar-
ily suggest that externally provided outcome knowledge 
has no effect on retrospective judgments. On unsuccess-
fully solved insight problems for which participants were 
later shown the solutions, participants’ retrospective situ-
ational judgments were similar to their initial judgments.
This seems to suggest that outcome knowledge had no ef-
fect on the retrospective judgment process. However, when
we consider that participants who were not given feedback 
on these problems showed significantly lower retrospec-
tive situational judgments, it seems that solution feedback 
did indeed have an effect in Experiment 1.
The implications of our discovery of internally gener-
ated hindsight effects can be illustrated by comparing our 
results to those of a previous study, which used insight and 
incremental problems to investigate the effects of outcome 
feedback on hindsight effect. Hoch and Loewenstein (1989,
Experiment 5) used a between-participants paradigm to 
investigate differences in hindsight bias on insight and 
incremental problems.4 In their study, participants were 
presented with two problems designed to require insightful 
solution processes and two problems designed to require 
incremental solution processes. All participants attempted 
to solve the problems for 3 min. Afterwards, half of the 
participants were immediately asked to predict the percent-
age of their peers who would correctly solve the problem 
(no-feedback, or predictive condition), and the other half 
were shown the correct solutions to the problems, and then 
asked to make the same judgment (feedback, or retrospec-
tive condition). Their results showed a clear hindsight bias 
effect on the insight problems and a reverse hindsight bias 
effect on the incremental problems.
At face value, these results seem to be inconsistent 
with the metacognitive judgment results found in the 
present Experiment 1, which showed positive hindsight 
bias effects on metacognitive judgments for both types 
of problems. However, we propose that the Hoch and 
Loewenstein (1989) results were actually just an artifact 
caused by the confounding of internal and external feed-
back in their design. In their investigation, successful 
and unsuccessful solvers were grouped together in the 
no-feedback group. In Experiment 2, we showed that in-
ternally generated feedback led to a large hindsight effect 
on metacognitive judgments for successfully solved math 
problems, as well as to a negative hindsight bias effect on 
unsuccessfully solved insight problems. Therefore, the 
pattern of hindsight bias effects observed by Hoch and 
Loewenstein’s investigation may have been driven by the 
effects of internally generated feedback in their between-
participants feedback groups. This example illustrates 
the importance of controlling for solution success and 
manipulating external feedback when investigating hind-
sight effects in performance-based paradigms, such as
ticularly on insight problems that we would expect solvers
to have different presolution and postsolution representa-
tions. The best explanation for the hindsight bias pattern
on these judgments is that individuals were using their 
final problem representations to reconstruct their initial
predictive judgments. In the case of successfully solved 
problems, the participants’ post solution representations
were more appropriate for solving the problem, because
the solvers had restructured their initial representations
as they solved the problem. In the case of unsuccessfully
solved problems, the postsolution representations were 
less appropriate for solving problems.
The same effects were not seen for the situational judg-
ments on math problems. Because the difficulty on these
math problems should not stem from inappropriate rep-
resentations, we would not expect the participants’ post-
solution representations for math problems to be structurally
different from their initial representations. According to the
updating and rejudging theory, if there is no representational
change between the time of the predictive and the retrospec-
tive judgments, then the judgments reconstructed from the
current representation should not be systematically biased,
because little has been updated. On the basis of these results,
we propose that updating and rejudging theories, once again,
provide the most plausible explanation for the hindsight ef-
fect patterns observed on situational judgments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present experiments, we investigated whether 
hindsight effects observed on different types of judgment 
tasks could be attributed to a unitary process or, alterna-
tively, whether hindsight effects could be better explained 
by judgment-specific cognitive reconstruction theories.
Both experiments found distinct patterns of hindsight for 
different problem types and judgment tasks. The results
of both experiments supported the notion that anchor and 
adjust theories provide the most plausible explanation of 
hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments and that updat-
ing and rejudging accounts provide the most plausible ex-
planation of hindsight bias for situational judgments. Thus, 
the results offer evidence that two competing models of 
hindsight bias are actually complementary explanations 
for judgment reconstruction on different types of tasks.
A novel result from this study came from the manipula-
tion of externally provided outcome knowledge across the 
two experiments. In most studies of hindsight effects, par-
ticipants are given outcome knowledge, such as the ending 
of a story, the answer to the trivia questions, or feedback 
on whether they had guessed or answered correctly. The 
general finding is that hindsight judgments are biased in
the direction of the given outcome. However, most hind-
sight studies that include a performance aspect, such as 
trivia question paradigms, simply examine the effects of 
solution feedback. Therefore, the analyses in these studies 
often collapse hindsight results across successful and un-
successful solvers. The present study shows that successful
solution attempts lead to the same hindsight effects as ex-
ternally provided feedback. Therefore, this calls into ques-
tion whether hindsight effects should be viewed as outcome 
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problem solving or trivia tasks. Furthermore, this com-
parison suggests that results from between-participants 
hindsight studies should be interpreted with caution when 
the design allows for the possibility of uncontrolled inter-
nally generated feedback.
Conclusions
The present study supports the general explanation that 
the hindsight bias is caused by people’s attempts to recon-
struct their original judgments on the basis of cues that are 
affected by outcome feedback. Although the preference
for parsimony may lead us to search for a unified expla-
nation of all hindsight bias effects, the empirical evidence 
suggests that hindsight bias may be best thought of as a 
taxonomic category describing a set of retrospective judg-
ment phenomena. Here we have identified two classes of 
judgments, metacognitive and situational, which require 
different judgment reconstruction processes in order to 
explain the observed patterns of hindsight bias. Hence, 
we conclude that the anchor and adjust and update and 
rejudge theories should be viewed as complementary ex-
planations of hindsight bias on different types of judgment 
tasks, not as competing accounts of the same general ret-
rospective judgment bias.
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effects as a function of these two solution types. Therefore, we collapsed 
across unsuccessful solutions in all hindsight effect analyses.
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NOTES
1. In a separate study, 47 introductory psychology students completed 
all eight problems (four insight, four math) while performing a think-
aloud protocol procedure. Video recordings were coded for instances 
of impasse by two independent coders (kappa ? .92). Analysis of the
percentage of problems categorized as displaying an impasse revealed 
that participants were 2.77 times more likely to exhibit signs of impasse
on the insight (M ? 61, SD ??21) than on the math (M ? 22%, SD ?
29) problems [t(46) ? 7.55, p ? .001, ?2 ? .55]. Since impasse during 
problem solving has been associated with representation difficulties and 
restructuring (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), we considered 
this to be evidence of the validity of our problem-type manipulation.
2. Because of the low number of incorrect and unsolved observations 
across the different problems, it was impossible to examine hindsight
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For each problem, the individual elements below the instructions were used in the component importance 
ratings. Elements that are underlined in each problem were coded as relevant components. All other elements
were coded as irrelevant components. No elements were underlined in the problems that were presented to
participants.
Math Problems
1. Solve for Y. Find the exact number that the variable Y equals by using only the necessary equations from 
the set of equations below.
3Z * 3? 27 2C? 9? Z P? C? 2 D
5Z ? 11?M 2X? 56?A 8M? C?Y
3Y? 14? X
2. Bob left home with an ATM card, a credit card, a checkbook, and $70 in his wallet. Below is a list of the 
purchases that he made during the day. How much money did Bob have in his wallet at the end of the day?
Location Type of Purchase Amount ($) Tax ($) Tip ($)
Corner Diner Credit 15.72 1.26 2.50
Quick Mart Credit 9.75 0.78 *
Rapid Transit Cash 1.50 * *
Sports Inc. Check 75.00 6.00 *
Fast Food Hut Cash 8.72 0.69 *
Movie Plaza Credit 11.00 * *
Movie Concession Cash 15.20 1.22 *
Rapid Transit Cash 1.50 * *
Mickey’s Pub Credit 22.50 1.80 4.50
(Continued on next page)
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3. Jane and Frank are driving from San Francisco to New York City. They have a chart that lists distances 
between cities and maximum speed limits on the connecting highways. Jane wants to use this chart to figure
out how far it is from San Francisco to New York City. What is the distance they must drive in order to get from 
San Francisco to New York City?
From To Number of Miles Speed Limit
Austin, TX Kansas City, MO 445 55 MPH
Boston, MA New York, NY 280 65 MPH
Cheyenne, WY Omaha, NE 500 70 MPH
Chicago, IL Toledo, OH 300 70 MPH
Detroit, MI Chicago, IL 455 65 MPH
Davenport, IA Chicago, IL 225 55 MPH
Omaha, NE Davenport, IA 325 65 MPH
San Francisco, CA Cheyenne, WY 450 65 MPH
San Francisco, CA L.A., CA 255 45 MPH
Toledo, OH New York, NY 565 65 MPH
Jacksonville, FL Washington, D.C. 660 55 MPH
4. Larry (age 35), his wife June (age 34) and his son Kenny (age 15) are going on a three-month camping trip 
in Alaska. Larry has heard stories of people getting snowed in during camping trips and not having enough food 
to survive. He wanted to be sure to send enough supplies to the cabin before he leaves on the trip. Larry got a list
of the amount of supplies needed per-day by people of different age groups. In total, exactly how many pounds 
of food supplies will his family need per day?
Amount Needed per Day (in Pounds)
Age and Gender Bread Vegetables Meat Water
Male child 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.9
Female senior citizen 4.3 3.2 3.6 6.5
Male baby 0.5 0.8 0.4 1.0
Male teen 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.2
Female teen 2.5 3.5 3.0 4.4
Female adult 4.0 3.7 3.5 5.5
Male senior citizen 4.4 4.5 2.0 6.7
Female baby 0.5 0.8 0.6 1.1
Male adult 3.5 4.0 3.3 6.0
Female child 0.9 1.4 1.0 2.0
Insight Problems
5. The triangle shown below points to the top of the page. Show how you can move 3 circles to get the triangle 
to point to the bottom of the page.
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6. The picture below is of six glasses. The first three contain liquid. Describe how you could make it so no 
two glasses containing liquid are next to each other, while keeping three of the six glasses full. To do this, you
are only allowed to move one glass.
Note—The second cup is used in both the correct solution and the most common incorrect solution (moving 
the second cup to the end). Therefore, this component was not used in the calculation of relevant or irrelevant 
components.
7. Below is a picture of an equation in which the Roman numerals are constructed using matchsticks. Notice 
that both sides of the equation are not mathematically equal. Describe how you could make both sides equal 
by moving only one matchstick. The rules are that: (a) only one stick is to be moved; (b) a stick cannot be dis-
carded; that is, it can only be moved from one position in the equation to another; (c) a slanted stick cannot be 
interpreted as a vertical matchstick; and (d) the result must be a correct arithmetic statement.
8. Below is a picture of an equation in which the Roman numerals are constructed using matchsticks. Notice 
that both sides of the equation are not mathematically equal. Describe how you could make both sides equal 
by moving only one matchstick. The rules are that: (a) only one stick is to be moved; (b) a stick cannot be dis-
carded; that is, it can only be moved from one position in the equation to another; (c) a slanted stick cannot be 
interpreted as a vertical matchstick; and (d) the result must be a correct arithmetic statement.
Note—This problem has two different solutions. Relevant components were calculated using the X term if 
participants used this term in solving. The participants in Experiment 1 were given the answer that involved the
IV term. Therefore, for all other participants, the IV term was used as the key component. Analyses using either or 
both of these components of the problem as relevant components did not change the overall pattern of results.
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